COLUMN | The UK Royal Navy and the challenge to maintain a potent fighting force [Naval Gazing]

The UK Royal Navy (RN), for generations the world’s strongest maritime force, has been in near-precipitous decline for the past 20 years. Underfunding, as successive governments gave increased priority to welfare spending, as well as rampant inflation of the cost of defence equipment, poor strategic decisions, and major recruitment difficulties have all played their part in this decline.

This near-perfect storm of problems has resulted in a force that is a faint echo of its former self, and that struggles to meet the stream of long-term and new operational commitments, many of them centred in or adjacent to the Middle East.

Erosion of the frigate force

The backbone of the RN is the Type 23 anti-submarine and general purpose frigate, up to three of which are usually fitted with towed array sonars to enable them to keep track of prowling Russian and Chinese submarines.

Sixteen of these warships were commissioned between 1989 and 2002. Three were sold off to Chile in the 2000s, as part of the then-Labour government’s post-Cold War policy of disposing of high-value defence assets in order to free up funding for additional social welfare projects.

Incidentally, Coalition and Conservative governments subsequently made matters even worse for the RN by selling off a helicopter carrier, an amphibious warfare support ship, and a solid stores replenishment vessel.

Age and hard use has progressively worn down the inventory of Type 23s. A number of the ships that were due to undergo major life-extending refits have been found to be beyond economical repair.

Latest predictions forecast that, by 2026, probably only seven will be serviceable. This will mean that no more than three to four will ever be available for deployment, so quite obviously, the RN will find it very difficult to meet its future commitments.

Many operations now have to be undertaken by small and lightly-armed River-class patrol ships, and even support ships of the RN’s paramilitary support fleet, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA).

Problem-plagued destroyers

The RN’s Type 45 air defence destroyers are potent vessels, and one, Diamond, recently put in an outstanding performance defending merchant shipping in the Red Sea from missile and drone attacks. However, as a result of both underfunding and constant tinkering with specifications, only six examples were eventually constructed rather than the planned 12.

From the time these ships entered service, they have suffered from serious propulsion and generator problems, requiring expensive remedial work. It has been unusual for more than one of the class to be operational at any time, although two are reportedly available at present.

Platform shortage hinders deployment

Meanwhile both of the RN’s specialist amphibious warfare vessels remain laid up due to shortage of crew.

The RN’s two aircraft carriers are very large and complex vessels, and their previous poor serviceability has been subject to much often-inaccurate comment. Both have completed major remedial work over the past two years, though, and one, Prince of Wales, is set to carry out a major Indo-Pacific deployment in 2025, with a so-for undeclared number of UK Royal Air Force F-35B Lightning II fighter-bombers embarked.

It remains to be seen whether both carriers will survive the oncoming umpteenth Defence Review, as they will be juicy potential targets for the bean counters.

Unsurprisingly, finding sufficient escorts for the Indo-Pacific foray has proved problematical, and, as a result, steadfast UK ally Norway will be providing a vessel to join a single RN frigate on the carrier’s protective screen.

Problems for new specialist ships

The UK Ministry of Defence has made much of the RN’s transition to uncrewed mine countermeasures vessels (MCMV). The RN has already sold off all but one of its manned Sandown-class MCMVs, so it is a source of embarrassment for the RN top brass that the recently-acquired uncrewed MCMV mother ship Stirling Castle, a former civilian offshore support vessel, and now part of the RFA, is already laid up with serious engineering problems.

Another urgently needed RFA vessel yet to enter service is the former offshore operations ship Proteus, which had been hailed when it was acquired from the oil business in 2023 as a revolutionary seabed warfare asset. The ship has since undergone extensive conversion work but remains sidelined with crewing, engineering, and mandatory docking period problems.

Elsewhere in the RFA, manpower pressures mean that only two of its four fast fleet tankers are available, and RN insiders say that the one remaining solid stores replenishment vessel is unlikely ever to go to sea again, owing to crewing and engineering difficulties.

Furthermore, plans for Harland and Wolff and Spain’s Navantia to jointly build three new such vessels have run into the sand owing to financial and political problems.

Poor submarine availability

The RN’s force of advanced Astute-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) is acknowledged as being (on paper, at least) a most formidable fighting force that is set to play a major role in the AUKUS project. However, shoreside engineering problems have so far reportedly greatly restricted the availability of these boats, though recent reports indicate that the situation is improving.

There have been periods when no Astute boat has been able to put to sea, and as a result, one old SSN has had to be retained in service as a stop gap well beyond its retirement date.

A national shame?

To the utter shame of UK’s recent civil and military leaders, the RN is currently in a wholly unacceptable state. Some remedial action, including the building of two tranches of new frigates, is in hand, but it will be at least three years before any improvement can be effected. The RN is also pouring money into automation and uncrewed vessel projects in an attempt to ameliorate serious crew shortages.

A forthcoming article will analyse plans to regenerate the RN.