Inaccurate stability calculations caused the capsizing of the Majuro-flagged vehicle carrier Golden Ray, an incident that resulted in US$200 million worth of damages, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) said on Tuesday, September 14.
The Marine Accident Report details the NTSB's investigation of the September 8, 2019, capsizing of the roll-on/roll-off vehicle carrier Golden Ray as it transited outbound through St Simons Sound near Brunswick, Georgia. All 23 crewmembers and one pilot on board were rescued, and this number include four engineering crew who were trapped in the vessel for nearly 40 hours.
Two crewmembers sustained serious injuries.
Golden Ray sustained significant damage due to fire, flooding, and saltwater corrosion and was declared a total loss estimated at US$62.5 million. An estimated US$142 million worth of cargo, including more than 4,100 vehicles, was also lost.
Less than 40 minutes after leaving port, the 660-foot (200-metre) Golden Ray began to heel rapidly to port during a 68-degree turn to starboard.
Despite attempts by the pilot and crew to counter the heel, the rate of turn to starboard increased, and the vessel reached a heel of 60 degrees to port in under a minute before it grounded outside of the channel.
The NTSB determined the probable cause of the capsizing was the chief officer's error entering ballast quantities into the stability calculation program, which led to his incorrect determination of the vessel's stability and resulted in the vessel having an insufficient righting arm to counteract the forces developed during a turn while transiting outbound from the Port of Brunswick through St Simons Sound.
Contributing to the accident was G-Marine Service's (the vessel's operator) lack of effective procedures in its safety management system for verifying stability calculations.
The NTSB concluded that Golden Ray did not meet international stability standards at departure and possessed less stability than the chief officer calculated.
According to the NTSB, after the vessel capsized, open watertight doors allowed flooding into the vessel, which blocked the primary egress from the engine room, where four crewmembers were trapped. Two watertight doors had been left open for almost two hours before the accident.
No one on the bridge ensured that the doors were closed before departing the port.
"The circumstances of this accident show that even when transiting in protected waters, watertight integrity is critical to the safety of the vessel and its crew," the report said. "It is essential that the operator ensure that crews verify that all watertight doors are closed in accordance with safety management system procedures."
As a result of its investigation, the NTSB issued two safety recommendations to G-Marine Service:
