OPINION | The case for AUKUS you should read – even if not yet the explanation we need

HMAS Farncomb
HMAS Farncomb, one of Australia’s Collins-class submarines, is set to be replaced under the AUKUS arrangement. (Photo: Australian Department of Defence/Aaron Robinson)

Since the AUKUS initiative was launched in September 2021, its Australian supporters and critics have been united on one point: that successive governments have failed to make a detailed strategic case for why Australia needs to acquire eight nuclear-powered submarines for its navy. No prime minister or senior minister has spoken on this subject beyond the broad rationale that Australia needs “deterrence”. What the government needs to explain is why it is choosing this particular form of deterrence.

That is the task Labor MP and former army officer Luke Gosling undertook when he agreed to write, for the Lowy Institute, “Deterring at a Distance: The Strategic Logic of AUKUS”. Last night (June 25), the paper was launched to a packed audience at the National Press Club in Canberra.

Gosling was introduced by Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles. It was a generous gesture towards a colleague, but judging by comments heard after the event, a number of people in the audience wondered why Marles himself wasn’t making Gosling’s argument.

“Public interest in defence matters, even high-profile cases such as AUKUS, is limited.”

There is a compelling, high-minded and maybe old-fashioned point to make here about the responsibility of governments to inform the public about big decisions. The traditional forum for such pronouncements is the national parliament, and Marles did make a detailed statement about AUKUS and sovereignty to the House of Representatives in February 2023.

But that wasn’t a speech about why Australia needs nuclear-powered submarines, and despite the public-interest argument, we may not get such a speech from Marles or his boss, Anthony Albanese, at least not soon. Although journalists and defence commentators want to hear such a speech, that’s a tiny audience.

Public interest in defence matters, even high-profile cases such as AUKUS, is limited. Besides, Lowy Institute polling suggests the project is popular.

“AUKUS is still in its infancy, in budget terms.”

Also, there is no urgent need to quiet internal Labor Party critics. Those critics may exist, but they have no strong reason to openly dissent.

AUKUS is still in its infancy, in budget terms. Australia won’t be spending big money for another five years, which means other ministers competing for the same slice of the budget have nothing to complain about yet.

In the meantime, observers of Australian defence policy have the chance to assess Luke Gosling’s paper. Indeed, he has the advantage of not being a minister: Gosling speaks more openly about the strategic challenges Australia faces from China than any minister could. AUKUS supporters and critics alike should read it.

This story originally appeared on The Interpreter, published by the Lowy Institute for International Policy.


Sam Roggeveen

Sam Roggeveen is Director of the Lowy Institute’s International Security Program. Before joining the Lowy Institute, he was a senior strategic analyst in Australia’s Office of National Assessments, where his work dealt mainly with North Asian strategic affairs, including nuclear strategy and Asian military forces. He also worked on arms control policy in Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs, and as an analyst in the Defence Intelligence Organisation.