Recent years have seen Beijing’s paramilitary maritime forces, namely, the patrol ships of the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the “fishing vessels” of the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), in the vanguard of China’s multi-pronged offshore expansionist operations. These are aimed at establishing de facto Chinese control over swathes of ocean and seabed.
Chinese maritime paramilitary operations have so far focused mainly upon multiple areas of the South China Sea (SCS) and, more recently, Taiwan-occupied islands situated very near to the Chinese mainland.
This strategy is nowadays meeting with increasing regional resistance, but it has so far ensured Chinese access to abundant fishing grounds, new military bases, and vast offshore energy resources. New hydrocarbon sources are now a priority for Beijing, as the nation’s onshore and littoral energy resources are running low.
The role of China’s paramilitary forces in promoting Beijing’s maritime ambitions is widely known. Seldom acknowledged, though, is more discreet support to these ambitions that is being supplied by the already vast and still rapidly expanding People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N).
This support is intensifying, and not only backs the aggressive operations of the CCG and the PAFMM, but is also progressively extending China’s sphere of maritime influence.
According to Philippine military sources, PLA-N warships sometimes maintain a relatively remote but occasionally visible proximity as Chinese paramilitary assets carry out harassment operations against Philippine Coast Guard-escorted offshore garrison resupply flotillas, while in July 2024 Chinese and Russian warships took part in a high profile joint exercise in the SCS.
Also, the PLA-N is now regularly conducting what it calls “combat patrols” in the sea. Additionally, in early August 2024, Chinese warships kept close watch on and, according to some reports, even used obstructive tactics against a major SCS exercise involving Philippine, Canadian, and US warships, as well as an Australian Orion maritime patrol aircraft.
On August 12, 2024, international reports stated that the PLA-N aircraft carrier Shandong and three escorts had taken up position off Japan’s Miyako Island in the East China Sea in an apparently politically-driven move. The Chinese flat-top arrived very shortly after the American nuclear–powered aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln had vacated the area, following an emergency operational redeployment to the Middle East.
There have also been numerous reports that a PLA-N Type 075 amphibious assault ship has been making regular deployments to the SCS since early this year, including significant periods loitering in the vicinity of the Chinese-occupied, Vietnam-claimed Paracel Islands.
Looking further afield, the PLA-N is increasingly involved in spreading Chinese influence beyond Asian waters, with the Chinese fleet taking part in exercises with many foreign navies.
The exercises are usually quite basic in nature as many of the maritime forces that the PLA-N carries out evolutions with suffer from a paucity of serviceable platforms and equipment. Also, they often rely mainly upon small patrol craft that, not infrequently, were supplied by Beijing.
Chinese naval deployments to Africa (a PLA-N task group is currently exercising with Mozambican and Tanzanian warships) are particularly valuable to Beijing’s long-term defence diplomacy programme. Also, some analysts have noticed that the PLA-N’s Africa deployments have a focus upon the regional nations, and there are many of them, that are heavily indebted to China.
PLA-N overseas deployments are at the leading edge of Beijing’s quest for overseas naval support facilities. This quest has so far achieved access to ports, or dedicated naval bases, in Sri Lanka, Equatorial Guinea, Djibouti, Pakistan, Cameroon, Cambodia, Vanuatu, Mozambique, and Mauritania.
Analysts increasingly believe that China’s massive naval buildup has the primary aim of bolstering Beijing’s worldwide influence, in pursuit of trade and political deals on terms favourable to China, rather than engaging rival navies in combat.
The PLA-N’s new equipment programme includes “super frigates,” destroyers, and submarines, but of particular concern to China’s closer neighbours is the build-up of Beijing’s organic seaborne aviation and amphibious warfare capabilities.
This expansion is adding very large and well-equipped, high-endurance assets to Beijing’s order of battle. Such assets are capable of extended, threatening, offshore poise, thereby providing a visible reminder of Chinese maritime reach.
Analysts have noted that a fourth aircraft carrier is reportedly being planned and a fourth Type 075 amphibious warfare vessel is under construction, while recent reports have confirmed that an unusual 50,000-tonne, catapult-fitted multi-role ship with troop and armoured vehicle transportation, drone and fixed wing aviation capabilities is in build.
The commissioning of such a warship will deliver an unambiguous, high-profile reminder of the burgeoning naval power that is underscoring China’s drive for international influence.